Julian Zelizer

Matt Blumberg: Welcome to Country Over Self, defining moments in American history. Each episode we welcome a notable historian to tell us the story of a president and a choice that president made to strengthen the country without regard to the impact of that decision on himself, his power, or his party.

Welcome to Country Over Self, defining moments in American history. I'm your host, Matt Blumberg, and I'm here today with New York Times bestselling author, CNN political analyst, and Princeton University professor, Julian Zelizer. Julian is the award winning author and editor of 26 books, including The Fierce Urgency of Now, Lyndon Johnson, Congress and the Battle for the Great Society.

Julian, welcome to Country Over Self. Thanks for having me. so as this show is all about storytelling and about doing a deep dive into a moment in the life of a president where that leader made a choice that reflected a desire to strengthen the country. either at the expense of, or at least without regard to, the potential impact on his own role or power or stature. and today, we're here to talk about our 36th president, Lyndon Baines Johnson. Johnson was a very consequential president, sort of thrust into the job on the assassination of JFK, winning a landslide election in 1964, escalating the war in Vietnam, passing a massive amount of domestic legislation called the Great Society, civil rights, voting rights, Medicare, Medicaid, ultimately withdrawing from the presidential race mid course in 1968, which is, of course, a decision that's kind of echoing right now in 2024, but with regard to Johnson and the concept of country over self or, at least country over party, I wanted to zero in on, sort of civil rights legislation that he orchestrated in 1964.

So let's start there. And, if, we start from that premise, kind of what, in one sentence, what's the, moment we're talking about? What's that defining moment? 

Julian Zelizer: Well, it's when president Johnson, told Bill Moyers, one of his top assistants, we've lost the South for a generation. After he signed the bill, and that was a moment where we can hear and see how President Johnson was willing to give a lot away in exchange for a legislative breakthrough.

Matt Blumberg: So let's start by backing up and doing a little context. what were the circumstances on the ground, around, civil rights, Kennedy, the Senate, at the time? 

Julian Zelizer: Unbearable pressure. The civil rights movement had been gaining strength and building throughout the early 1960s, really back into the 1950s.

You had many different leaders from organizations, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Martin Luther King of the SCLC, and new organizations like SNCC being led by people like, Ella Baker. And they were organizing, in states like Mississippi and Alabama. They were exposing what white racism was, television cameras in 1963 captured police violently attacking children who were protesting non violently.

And within Congress, both the House and the Senate. During this 1960 to 64 period, you have more Northern legislators, both Democrats and Republicans who are starting to say we need to do something and the big legislation is a Civil Rights Act of 1964, which ends legal segregation and creates a commission that is going to oversee, civil rights in employment.

And Lyndon Johnson becomes president. Kennedy had been very reluctant during his presidency to tackle this, terrified that Southern Democrats are going to break with him. and he's going to lose any chance of passing anything and lose reelection. Johnson had been famously opposed to civil rights bills throughout much of his career, but in the spring of 1964, he works with liberals in the Senate, like Senator Humphrey, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, and they break the Southern filibuster and pass the legislation.

Matt Blumberg: Talk a little bit about the strength of the Southern filibuster and, the, legislative climate in the 50s and 60s, which I think is, is different than what, people see today. 

Julian Zelizer: It was very different. both parties in the fifties and sixties were deeply divided internally.

Democrats were divided between Southern Democrats who were very conservative on race and unions and liberal Democrats from the North, primarily who were clamoring for federal legislation on a whole host of issues from healthcare to civil rights. And so, to be president, a democratic president, you basically had to figure out how do you balance these two clashing constituencies, and what are the costs that you're willing to incur to, to try to push legislation through.

Southerners had a lot of power. They controlled most of the major committees in the House and Senate. They were the chairs because of seniority. And in that era, the chairs of committee were autonomous, and they really controlled the show, not the speaker. And also, they had the filibuster. They had enough, Southerners in a Southern caucus led by Richard Russell of Georgia, and they could basically talk the Senate, to its knees essentially, if they didn't want something to pass, and that something in that era was usually civil rights.

So, you were going up against a lot, And we didn't even talk about southern voters who are key to the democratic party if you are going to move forward on this issue. 

Matt Blumberg: Yeah, there's just so many aspects of that are that have changed over time. The seniority system, the way filibusters work, that I think people sometimes forget how powerful, just a couple of key senators could be, in those years.

Julian Zelizer: Yeah, I mean, and one person who knew this well was Lyndon Johnson because he had been Senate majority leader in the 1950s, and he had before that been in the House. So he really understood the system and that was a virtue in that he knew, who was in the Senate. He had great relations with a lot of these members.

He was trusted by Southerners. They always saw him as the only Southerner who could ever probably win the presidency in the post World War II period, and he also knew the rules of the Senate extremely well and the House. So he had some sense of what it would take, to get through. But at the same time, and people forget this, he also understood that Congress really ran the show and that a president, even him, couldn't do whatever they wanted if, the Senate was stacked up against you.

Matt Blumberg: So one of the moments I found so compelling the way you told the story in your book, was how in the immediate aftermath of Kennedy's assassination, that Johnson sat down with Moyers and started mapping out his legislative agenda month by month, stretching out eight years. and so he obviously felt like he could get something done where JFK couldn't.

So I'd love to hear some of your thoughts on, from that moment of mapping it out, how did he think he could get it done or what was he less concerned about than Kennedy and how did he get it done? 

Julian Zelizer: Well, he maps this, so he takes over after Kennedy's assassination, and it's true that he really maps out what he wants, but also when he wants to do it.

And the premise of the schedule is essentially his power was limited, not that it was endless. It's the opposite of how we think of Lyndon Johnson. He understands that he has a short window to get a lot through, and he wants a combination of some of the legislation Kennedy had stalled on. This includes a tax cut, includes health care, Medicare, and it includes civil rights.

And then he wants to do a lot more. He essentially wants to outshine, his mentor and idol, Franklin Roosevelt. He wants a second New Deal. He wants to be that bold as president, and he had been moved by the civil rights movement like many other politicians. So, the whole idea of a window is, from the time he takes over through the first midterms, should he be reelected, that's the only time he was going to have to get anything done.

He said, once the midterms happen, I'm done. the legislate, legislators in both chambers are not going to work with me anymore. The controversial stuff will just get stifled in committee. and so understanding the limits of his power actually kind of accelerated what he wanted to do right away. 

Matt Blumberg: Talk about, what you call in the book, the treatment, , look presidents all have some flavor of bully pulpit that they can use. But I think his was kind of unique. 

Julian Zelizer: It was, physical, and verbal. And so the treatment. It was well known if you worked in Washington and you can see photos of it if you just Google it. And basically, in person, very frequently he, he was big guy, over six feet and a pretty bulky and he would get into the face of a senator or a member of the house and basically lobby them for a yes or no, depending on what the answer he wanted was.

And, he wouldn't get out of their physical space until they said, yes, that was the legend of the treatment. And there's a lot of truth to that. You can also hear it on his phone calls. It's a different version of it. He's not in front of them, but he almost won't hang up the phone. And he'll keep calling someone until they're turned.

And so it embodies a very aggressive approach to politics, that often is spoken about today. Sometimes people say, certain presidents need more of that where, it's a bit of intimidation, a bit of seduction, and just, incessant effort to get the results that are desired. 

Matt Blumberg: So let's talk about the, impact of, of his decision on history. So obviously there's a tremendous amount of impact in terms of civil rights itself, but, the impact of the decision on his sort of prediction that he was handing the South to the Republicans for a generation. the Democrats obviously, won in 64, but the Republicans carried the South in 64. And then Republicans went on to win five of the next six presidential elections. And the only exception you could argue was due to Watergate. so would love to hear sort of your thoughts on his prediction and how it turned out for the Dems. 

Julian Zelizer: Yeah, I mean the it was happening already. That's the one thing people, often downplay. Meaning even in the 1950s when Eisenhower's re elected twice you see southern states start to shift. Kennedy in 1960 is already very worried about this and sees that same shift. That is why he brings Lyndon Johnson on as his running mate. So it's already happening.

And the reaction to civil rights and all the activity in the post World War II period among white Southerners was quite strong. And so, it's a bit exaggerated to, I mean, on Johnson's own self, sense of self. That it was all because of what he did. That said, the trend is true. I mean, Southerners, Southern white voters would move from today what we call blue to red.

And this would become a base of a conservative Republican party. And so there was a cost to it. on the other hand, the Democrats gained a lot. I mean, the coalition that emerges over the long term that culminates in, President's Clinton, President Obama, and even President Biden, as well as, ongoing, not, after 94 sequential, but still ongoing majorities in the House and Senate was built around the coalition that emerges after 64. Black voters, Latino voters, college educated voters, you get none of that had the party not committed to civil rights in 64 and 1965, had voting rights not been passed in 65, which literally allows, all of these voting constituencies to vote. there were great political benefits.

So, I think, it, we can think of a transformation, but I don't think it was all costs, for the party in terms of what they did. And, finally a civil rights activists would say there was a moral gain. There was a clear moral question. And in their minds, and in the minds of many Americans through this day, at that moment, the Democrats made the right decision.

And even if there were costs, it was a cost well worth it for defining what the party was about. 

Matt Blumberg: And what do you think the impacts of the decision was on Johnson's reputation. 

Julian Zelizer: Look in the South, it didn't necessarily help him, but I think for a lot of Democrats, it has defined him then and defined him through this day.

Meaning when we think of Lyndon Johnson, he's an incredibly controversial president and, his policy in Vietnam was a total disaster and for many, decades and still today defines him. He wasn't always a success and many people who lived through the 60s, that's the last thing they think about him. It was so damaging that war to people, to humans, to America's place overseas, to just everything. But when we do speak well about him and we think about what made him effective, often what we point to, whether it's, Medicare or civil rights and voting rights, it's that, it's his ability to do what other presidents didn't do.

And getting back to earlier in our conversation, his willingness to take huge risks and spend a lot of political capital on legislation that he thought would be legacy making. So I think overall it helped his reputation, but it doesn't erase, both the problems of Vietnam and some of the limits on some civil rights issues he doesn't actually move forward with that same gusto. He gets scared and including issues of policing. And so it's mixed, but I think still. those are kind of the best in terms of what we think of when we think of Lyndon Johnson. 

Matt Blumberg: What did it do for his relationship with Richard Russell? I mean, that was one of his mentors. He was sort of the, the leader of the stick in the mud crowd in the Senate. But I, I got the sense, from your book and from others that I've read that he sort of realized that some of this was inevitable but what was their relationship like in the aftermath of it?

Julian Zelizer: It remains pretty good. I mean, you can listen to the tapes, also available online for free, a lot of them, and they keep talking. Russell often consults him and helps him think through issues like Vietnam, or even domestic issues. It doesn't sever their relationship at all. I think Russell, of all the Southerners, was a bit of a realist.

Not that he supported civil rights legislation, but he understood it was coming and he decides, unlike some others, like a Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, to spend less time just totally resisting it. And he basically gives Johnson, tacit authority to do what he needs to do. so in that way he is being supportive.

So their relationship, remains a very important one for Johnson. Again, Russell is the reason Johnson became a leader in the Congress. Russell elevates him to Senate Minority Leader very early on, a few years after he's elected to the Senate, and then Majority Leader. And he always, again, thought he will accept Johnson's liberalism, because it was still their best Southern option if they were going to have someone in power.

Matt Blumberg: All right. very interesting. I want to close now with sort of four kind of rapid fire questions. so we talked about Johnson today. What's your favorite example of a different president, choosing country over self? 

Julian Zelizer: Well, I like to talk about one. Well, I'll give you two quick ones, both one term presidents. I think, president Jimmy Carter. really focusing a lot of energy on the environment and conservation. Very early on, it had no political payoff. It was controversial within the Democratic Party and arguably hurt him. I like that because he truly was a president who was thinking of problems the nation faced rather than just problems he or his party faced.

And a second would be President George H. W. Bush in 1990 pushing through a major deficit reduction deal. He believed it was the right thing to do, but he raised taxes. He contradicted a campaign pledge. He angered conservatives like Newt Gingrich. But for me, that's yet another model of how presidents can take big steps they think are important, even if the costs and fallout will be severe.

Matt Blumberg: All right, so the second question is the opposite. what's a poignant example you can think of where a president chose self over country. let's exclude, let's say living presidents and ex presidents. 

Julian Zelizer: Well, that was the easy answer right there, but certainly Richard Nixon. I think, in this day and age, we, some people downplay a little the severity of Watergate, but Watergate was a story, not just of a campaign break in, it was a story of abusing, severely abusing presidential power, spying on enemies, trying to use policy and the arms of government to go after opponents.

And Nixon, who is very talented, very smart, by 1971 and 72, is a president who embodies, kind of self centered action, to preserve himself and his power over what was best for the democracy. not just in terms of policy, but our own health. So, so he's the opposite, I think, 

Matt Blumberg: Next question. Let's talk about President Biden for just a second. So his withdrawal from the race here in 2024, to some extent you could view as an act of choosing country over self. But I guess my question for you is how do you think history will view that over time, against, first of all, the backdrop of being in the race at age 81 to begin with.

How do you think history will view that, or do you think it sort of depends on the outcome of the race? 

Julian Zelizer: I think it depends on the outcome of the race. And I think, because a lot of people will argue he only did this once he had no options, meaning there was so much pressure from Democrats who were making it clear they were going to abandon him it wasn't totally selfless. it was also, by the time it happens, almost inevitable, otherwise the party would have had a huge problem. So because of that, it will really depend. I think because of those feelings, I think a lot of Democrats will be much kinder to him as they start to interpret the history.

And historians will look at the history in one way. If it results in, Vice President Harris winning the presidency, a continuation of his policies and really a revitalization of the party. Should she lose and should we have a second term for Donald Trump. I think many Democrats, many scholars will look at his hesitation and his, closing up of the primaries and the pressure that he put to really not have a competitive primary in a very different light. They will see that as very costly, and someone who was effective as president ultimately didn't just doom himself, but doomed the party and opened the door to a second term of a president many Democrats, feels very dangerous. 

Matt Blumberg: All right last of the rapid fire questions, knowing everything you know, about our history and our system of government, if you could wave a magic wand and make one or two changes to our system to strengthen it, whether they require a constitutional amendment or not, what would they be?

Julian Zelizer: Well, I would, one is, continuing with the electoral reforms that were put into place in 2022 to tighten up all the holes in our electoral college system so that January 6th and everything surrounding it can't happen again. And, that was a limited reform. There's a lot more, but that would be without any question, number one.

Number two. is dismantling some of the tools used in the Senate, to obstruct business. And that would be even without getting rid of the filibuster, lowering the threshold to end one, and reforming things like the debt ceiling, which have now been used as weapons that can have really destructive consequences if things don't go well.

So those would be the two areas I'd focus on reform. 

Matt Blumberg: So last question, are you working on any new book or projects at the moment that, you want to give listeners a preview of? 

Julian Zelizer: Sure. I have a book coming out in January, January 14th of 2025 called In Defense of Partisanship. it's a short provocative book about what parties have done well in this country and how they can be reformed, so that we can benefit from partisanship rather than seeing it as a problem.

And second, I'm working on a book on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. group of civil rights activists in Freedom Summer, 1964 that challenged the Democratic Party and Lyndon Johnson, to seat them at the Democratic Convention instead of the all white delegation whose power rested on their disenfranchisement.

Matt Blumberg: Well, I look forward to seeing all of that. Julian Zelizer, Princeton University historian and bestselling author. Thank you for joining us today on Country Over Self. 

Julian Zelizer:Thanks for having me.

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